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We consider optimal behavior in a class of spatial-dynamic economic problems related to a 
negative externality with stock effects, via the development of a dynamic, non-cooperative game.  
Feedback Nash equilibrium response functions are parameterized based on an invasive weed 
found on western US cattle ranches.  Simulations illustrate trade-offs between increasing costs of 
management efforts, the invasives’ impact on productivity and temporal growth impacts, when 
another agent’s effort and infestation levels are considered.  Symmetric and asymmetric cases as 
well as the socially optimal and second-best alternatives are considered.  Optimal strategies are 
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1.0 Introduction 
Invasive species negatively impact local and regional economies through increased 
cropping, grazing, and recreational costs, as well as through impacts on water quality and 
quantity and soil quality.  Specific to invasive weeds one often cited study (Pimentel et al. 2005) 
estimates that invasive weeds cost US agriculture about $24 billion annually.  There is little 
doubt that size of these damages, particularly in individual agricultural sectors, inflict substantial 
costs on the industry and that the control of invasive weeds could produce significant benefits.  
Efficiently controlling invasive species, however, is a complex management problem for 
many reasons.  For example, the speed with which the problem is recognized and control 
decisions are made can greatly impact the level of harm caused by the invasion and mitigation 
costs.  In addition, those impacted (even if they undertake mitigation) have the economic 
incentive to base their decisions on private benefits and costs, which can lead to a less than 
efficient control level.  From the public perspective, providing the individual incentives to 
efficiently control invasions is impossible without understanding the behavioral characteristics of 
the private parties and the interdependencies in their private decisions.  These problem 
characteristics are not unique to invasive species and can be found in other spatial-dynamic 
problems related to natural resources (see, Smith et al. 2009, for a review).  While possible 
complexities in the evolution of biological agents have been scrutinized in economic 
frameworks, the possibility for strategic behavior by economic agents in spatial-dynamic 
problems has been largely ignored, although there is a substantial literature on strategic behavior 
applied to other environmental problems (e.g., Puller 2006).  Specific to cattle ranching, a recent 
survey by Thacher et al. (2009) suggests ranchers do consider strategy.  For example, a majority 
of respondents indicate they would increase their weed management effort if their neighbors 
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increased their effort.  Is this an optimal strategy?  If yes, then under what conditions?  If no, 
what is an optimal strategy?     
In order to help answer such questions, we construct a dynamic, non-cooperative game to 
provide insight into agents’ optimal actions when the individual agent faces an invasive weed on 
his rangeland.  The growth of the invasive on an agent’s rangeland is impacted not only by the 
state of his land and his actions, but also by that of other agents.  If agents recognize the impact 
of others on their production, they naturally take this into account in their decisions.  We assume 
this to be the case and account for these interactions in decisions and states with a feedback 
Nash-solution-path of effort for the individual agent.  This allows insight into the impact from 
the growth of the invasive as well as from the actions of other agents.  
Utilizing this model we perform a series of dynamic numerical simulations, stylized for 
Yellow Starthistle (YST) and beef cattle ranching in semi-arid western states where YST is 
present, but has not yet resulted in substantial economic impacts (e.g., New Mexico, Colorado, or 
Arizona).  We find that at low-level infestations (10%), initial optimal efforts are high, 
eradicating 90% of the invasive that is present in the initial time period.  At the highest initial 
level of the infestation simulated (50%), optimal effort in the initial period eradicates less than 
80% of the invasive.  These results are consistent with those of Olson and Roy (2008) in a more 
general setting. 
With asymmetric agents, the agent with the lower infestation finds it optimal, in some 
cases to exert more effort (relative to the symmetric case), thereby avoiding a large negative 
impact on his own net present value (NPV).  Agents with higher initial infestations can enjoy 
positive externalities being adjacent to lower level infestation agents.   Furthermore, if the high 
infestation level (50%) agent initially does nothing, their second-best path is to continue to do 
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nothing.  When faced with this agent, the low-level infestation agent finds it optimal to exert 
maximum effort in every period.  These results, while stylized, suggest that the effective 
management of a negative externality, invasive species will require a superior understanding of 
the biologic spread of the species and the strategic economic choices of individual agents.  
Efficient management efforts may be scenario specific. 
 
2.0 Background 
When characterizing equilibria in strategic-form, non-cooperative games, Nash’s (1951) 
approach has been referred to as “probably the most important solution concept in game theory” 
(Meyerson, 1991, p.105).  The key element of the Nash equilibrium in this setting is that no 
player can increase his payoff by unilaterally deviating from the strategy profile, making it self-
enforcing.  This powerful condition holds whether players select pure or mixed strategies and 
allows us to conveniently consider the case of asymmetric agents. 
Martin et al. (1993) developed one of the first dynamic games, applied to a transboundary 
pollution stock with asymmetric agents.  They employed subgame perfect, feedback Nash 
equilbria.  This allows for players’ optimal strategy sets to define an equilibrium set of decisions 
at any point in time.  The model for a single pollutant stock provides a policy evaluation for 
tax/subsidy schemes for the transboundary pollutant.  Other single stock games include Mäler 
and De Zeeuw (1998), who constructed an acid rain differential game focusing on individual 
agents’ buffer stocks, which include non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibria.  Both models 
include a diffusion factor.  Specific to wildlife, Clement and Wan (1985) develop a predator-
prey, common pool game that allows for agents to harvest from either the predator or prey stock.  
Bhat and Huffaker (2007) develop a dynamic game for the management of transboundary, 
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nuisance-wildlife populations and focus on variable-transfer-payments contracts.  Specific to 
invasive weeds, Grimsrud et al. (2008) construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium game. 
There is a growing literature modeling the interactions between grazing, stocking rates, 
and the level of invasives.  For example, Finnoff et al. (2008) find that nitrogen deposition and 
stocking practices determine optimal cattle stocking rates when invasives are present; however 
they ignore possible strategic rancher behavior.  Eiswerth and van Kooten (2007) attempt to deal 
with the complex issues in grazing-land economic damage and invasive’s control using a model 
of learning.  Their approach tends to beg the question of how long ranchers might be expected to 
continue learning before behaving strategically and reacting optimally to other’s control efforts.  
In an earlier paper, Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) developed a stochastic optimal control 
model for an invasive weed in California and provided an empirical illustration of the model 
results finding the optimal management choice and comparing the result to a mangemnt strategy 
of eradication.  They find management, rather than eradication, is optimal. 
Our research draws on key aspects of the above literature for the dynamic, strategic 
invasive weed problem.  In the next section,we present the feedback Nash equilibrium theoretical 
model and its parameterization.  Section four presents dynamic simulations based on the 
parameterized model with sub-sections for variations in carrying capacity, for asymmetric 
agents, social optimality including the value of information, and the second-best with a myopic 
starting point.  Section five makes conclusions and considers some possible extensions. 
 
3.0 Theoretic Model 
Consider the case where the private agents are cattle ranchers who can run their cattle on 




(t) define the stock 
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(t) denote the management effort of agent i during 
time t (control variable).  Let the game have N heterogeneous agents where agent i's net benefits 
from management choices for a certain level of infestation are conditioned on a vector of 
characteristics specific to that individual, iA  (e.g., risk preferences or management style) or land 
characteristics (e.g., distribution and/or size of land parcels, or land ownership).  In reality, the 
benefits are indirectly a function of the state, as the level of infestation impacts the forage, which 
in turn impacts the output of this process, which is the volume of beef available for market.  We 









),  i = 1,...., N ,   t = 1,...,T .  (1) 
We allow for asymmetries in net benefits associated with management effort.  For some 
subset of the N agents, ( 1,..., )j k= , there are positive net benefits from management effort, that 
is, 0i iB w! ! > , while for the remaining agents ( 1,..., )k N+ , there are negative net benefits 
associated with management, 0i iB w! ! < .  In either case there are diminishing returns to 
invasive species management, 2 2 0.i iB w! ! <  Furthermore, 
2 20 and 0.  i i i iB B! !" " < " " < That is, benefits are inversely related to and diminishing in the 
stock of the invasive species.  The impact on benefits of each of the individual’s characteristics 
depends on the individual observable characteristic in question.  Let ai represent a single 
characteristic of agent i, where ai !Ai .  Then  !Bi !ai
<
>
0 , depending on the characteristic in 
question.   
Conditional on the initial state, ,0(0) ,i i! !=  agent i will choose the management path over 
time that maximizes  
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given the choices of other agents where  wj(t) is the vector of all other agents’  (i !j)  
management choices from  t = 0,...,T .   A terminal future period is chosen to mirror the fact that 
agents would be unlikely to consider the possible infinite future impacts of their actions.  The 
assumption also makes extensions to consider the more likely impacts of shortening of time 
horizons, more straight-forward.  
Similar to Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) we model the transition equation including the weed 
growth rate, gi (!i (t)).  We also allow that the effort of all agents, w(t), and the effectiveness of 










(!(t)),w(t),"( )  (3) 
where  0 "! " 1.  Equation (3) defines the invasive species stock at any point in time. 
Each agent i, at time t, observes the current level of stock and then chooses the optimal 
management effort consistent with ( ) ( ( )).i i iw t t! "=  This rule defines a mapping of management 
effort levels associated with each potential stock level, ( ).i t!   A solution to this game is 
determined by the set of N strategies that result in an equilibrium.  We assume all agents make 
their management effort choices simultaneously in each instant of the game.  Further we assume 
each agent takes all other players’ strategies into account in making his or her decision.  A Nash 














































where “*” indicates the optimal path, defined as the path of strategies through time that yields 
agent i cumulative net benefits at least as large or larger than any other path would, given the 
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strategy choices of all other players.  Thus agents affected by invasive species will determine 
their management strategy conditional on all other agents’ management strategies with respect to 
the invasive species.  The invasive species management problem is hence formulated as a 
negative externality problem where the impact of actions on the individual agent’s stock is 
determined by collective decisions about management efforts and other agents’ stocks, where the 
individual agent will not observe any effects of collective management choices on the stock of 
the invasive species until the next time period.3   
At this level of generality we can say little concerning the characteristics of the optimal 
effort path for an individual agent.  Thus, we turn to specific functional forms that provide an 
interior solution to the problem and allow us to focus on the economics of the dynamic game. 4  
Consider the price-taking, profit maximizing beef producer who is confronted with an 
invasive weed that impacts the productivity of his or her rangeland (where N=i,j).  Agent i’s 
gross profits (GP) are described by; 
  




 p = per pound price of beef (net of costs to produce beef), 
iS = pounds of beef available for sale produced at maximum carrying capacity of beef per acre 
(assumed constant), and 
i! = percentage of acres infested by invasive weeds, 0 1i!" " . 
 
We assume agent i produces at the optimal carrying capacity on the land, given the level 
of infestation.  Thus, if there are no invasive weeds ( 0)i! = , production is that attainable at 
maximum carrying capacity, iS .  As the level of the invasive increases, productivity of the land, 
(1 )i iS "! , decreases proportionately to the level of infestation.  A complete infestation 
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corresponds to a level of invasion where there may be some feed-grasses remaining on some of 
the acreage but at insufficient levels to sustain a minimal number of cattle without additional 
feed sources.5 
 Costs to eradicate or remove the invasive weeds in a single period (assumed additively 
separable from the costs to produce beef) are described by the quadratic form 
  
 TCi = ai!iwi + biwi
2  (5) 
 
 
where  wi = agent i's effort to eradicate, where the weed percentage eradicated is 0 i iw !" " and 
ai and bi are positive constant parameters associated with removing iw of an infestation.  From 
this "TCi "wi > 0,  "
2TCi wi
2 > 0,  "TCi "!i > 0,  and "
2TCi "!i
2
= 0 , resulting in increasing 
marginal costs of effort and higher costs to remove with higher infestation levels. 




#i (t) = $i#i (t) ! wi (t) 1 + % iwj (t)( ) +& iSi 1!#i (t)( ) + "i # j (t) ! wj (t)( ) + di .  (6) 
 
Equation (6) allows the growth of the invasive weed to be dependent on a number of factors.  
First, the existing weed infestation on the land grows, ( ),  where i i it! ! ! is the intrinsic growth 
rate specific to agent i's land.  We allow for impacts on growth by the actions of agents i and j. 6    
Effort by agent i reduces the growth of the infestation.  In addition, there can be synergies 













, where i& is a positive constant specific to agent i's problem 
and ( ) and ( )i jw t w t are the effort levels of agents i and j, respectively in time t.  
Grazing activity on agent i’s land impacts the level of infestation.  Grazing stresses the 
non-weed stock, while leaving the invasive untouched, allowing the invasive greater growth.7 
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, where i! is a positive constant specific to agent i's problem. 
The level of the invasive can also be impacted by the state of other agents’ lands (e.g., 
from wind or water transport) and their individual efforts, ( )( ) ( ) ,i j jt w t" #$ %"
& '
where i! , a 
positive constant, is the dispersion factor from agent j’s land to agent i's land.  Finally, the level 
of infestation can be impacted by dispersion not associated with other agents, di.  This is a 
positive constant, which could, for example, represent transport by tires or animals from 
community activities.   
Assuming a fixed time horizon, [0, ]t T! , an initial infestation level, ,0(0)i i! != , and a 












































































































































(t)( ) " !i (t)(#i " $ iSi )  (10) 
 
































< 0 , 
which is as would be expected since the stock of invasive weeds, ,i! is a bad.  The sign on 
( )i t!
! will depend on the signs and magnitudes of the two expressions on the right hand side of 













(t)( )( ) , and the value of the marginal change in the infestation 









i( )( ).  The discounted marginal value is 
unequivocally positive.  The value of the marginal change in the infestation level depends on 
whether the impact on the growth of the invasive from the existing infestation level( )i!  is 
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Taking the time derivative of (9) and solving for ( )iw t! yields the change in the response 
function for agent i.  That is; 
 ( ) ( )1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) .
2
i ir t r t
i i i i i i i i i i j i i j
i
w t r a t b w t a e t w t e t w t
b
" " % ! % !
# %= + " " + "
$ &
! !! !    (12) 
 
Similarly, the change in agent j’s response function is; 
 13 
 ( ) ( )1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) .
2
j jr t r t
j j j j j j j j j j i j j i
j
w t r a t b w t a e t w t e t w t
b
" " % ! % !
# %= + " " + "
$ &
! !! !  (13) 
 
At this level of generality the signs on (12) and (13) cannot be determined 
unambiguously.  Instead, we turn to dynamic simulation in order to determine the optimal effort 
paths for agents i and j.  Equations (12) and (13) along with equations (6), (9), and (10) (for both 
agents i and j) provide the basis for our numerical simulations.8   
 
4.0 Dynamic Simulations 
We parameterize the dynamic model from the previous section and simulate to capture 
the characteristics of Yellow Starthistle (YST) and its potential impact on management strategies 
for cattle ranching in western states.  
YST entered the US in the early 1800’s via contaminated alfalfa seed from Eurasia and 
was first documented in California (CA) in 1824 and has migrated eastward.  YST is found in 41 
of the contiguous states and is reported as invasive in natural areas in six states. (Murphy, 2005).  
The future potential impact of YST on western ranching could be substantial.  Consider 
the case of CA, where the spread of YST increased over one thousand percent between 1958 and 
2002 (estimated infested acreage increased from about one million in 1958 to over 15 million 
acres by 2002 (Pitcairn et al. 2006).  Eighty-five percent of CA counties report YST (NRCS 
2006).  Total losses of livestock forage in CA due to YST infestation are estimated to be almost 
$8 million annually.  Add this to the estimated, annual out of pocket costs to CA ranchers for 
control of YST of almost $9.5 million and it is evident that YST has a considerable impact on the 
grazing livestock sector (Eagle et al. 2006).  In addition to CA, Oregon, Washington and Idaho 
have high levels of YST infestations with 72%, 66%, and 62% of counties, respectively, 
reporting occurrences.  The level of occurrence is much lower in other western states.  For 
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example, Nevada reports the presence of YST in almost 30% of counties; New Mexico reports 
about 18% of counties; Wyoming about 8%; and Colorado about 3% (NRCS 2006). 
The rapid spread of YST can, in part, be attributed to its characteristics.  It is a winter 
annual that germinates in the fall.  In early summer, long stocks with bright-yellow, spiny 
flowers appear.  The dried flower heads release seeds during late summer and early fall.  A 
single flower can produce 100,000 seeds (Eagle et al. 2006).  There is a high viability rate and 
the seeds can remain productive for up to a decade.  The seeds are easily dispersed through 
human and animal activity, as well as through water and short distance wind transport.  The 
viability of the seeds can be impacted by the climate and elevation.9   
YST can be especially problematic in pastures and rangeland.  While it is edible by cattle 
during early stages of growth the spines on the yellow flowers are long, resulting in cattle 
avoiding grazing even near the plant.  Cattle forced to eat the plant at this stage can also sustain 
injury (Shelley et al. 1999).  Barry (1995) estimates that there is less crude protein and digestible 
nutrients in infested rangeland than in un-infested acreage. This reduces carrying capacity and 
productivity of land.  
Considering the progression of YST across the western US, its’ impact on rangeland; its 
current low-level presence in many states; the attributes of rangeland in the states; and the 
importance of cattle ranching to state economies, it is an important invasive weed to consider.   
While the spread of YST may be slower in other western states than was seen in CA, the 
economic impact could be considerable, making the management choices just as germane.  For 
example, consider New Mexico (NM) where, according to the USDA 2007 Agricultural Census, 
over 85% of agricultural land is in pastureland and rangeland.  Beef cattle account for over $570 
million, or about 35%, of the total value of NM livestock and their products sold.  The value 
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from this sector is second only to that of the dairy industry.   The contribution of beef cattle in 
other western states is even higher.  In Colorado, 77% of the total value of livestock and products 
sold is attributed to beef cattle, while in Wyoming the figure is 85%.   
Western cattle ranching is an industry of contrasts.  Depending on the location of the 
ranch, the size could vary from a few acres to several thousand acres.  Land may or may not be 
irrigated.  Elevation, precipitation, and vegetation also vary greatly.  Many of these factors can 
contribute to the carrying capacity of the land.   And finally, ranchers are a diverse lot culturally 
and economically.10 
What are the optimal strategies for western ranchers?  We parameterize the model 
developed in the previous section to reflect the growth of YST and ranching conditions found in 
the western US.  Table 1 provides the baseline parameters. 
[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
4.1 Baseline Results.   First we consider the growth of the invasive when there is no 
human activity, using the specification in (6) and relevant parameter values from table 1.  Figure 
1 shows the growth of the stock of the invasive.  In the initial year, the only source of the 
invasive is the 0.5% from community diffusion.  Assuming no grazing activity or weed 
management effort, the intrinsic growth rate, coupled with community diffusion results in a 
100% infestation by year 22. 
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
For our baseline simulations, we first consider symmetric agents over a range of initial 
infestations.  Specifically, we consider 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% initial infestation levels.  
These are the equivalent of beginning a management program in approximately years 12 (10%), 
15 (20%), 17 (30%), 18 (40%), or 19 (50%) - from figure 1. 
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  Figures 2 and 3 present the optimal effort paths and resulting infestation levels, 
respectively, for one of our symmetric agents under these initial infestation levels.  While the 
effort paths in figure 2 are similar in profile, it is notable that at lower levels of infestation, the 
optimal beginning level of effort is closer to the initial level of infestation, while at higher initial 
levels, the optimal initial effort is substantially less than the initial infestation level.  With the 
exception of the 10% case, we find that all of the effort paths converge to almost identical levels 
in the later years.  In all cases, as indicated in figure 3, the resulting infestation levels decline in 
the early years with the optimal effort.  In later years, there are increases in the infestation levels, 
due to reduced effort and the impact of the diffusion of the weed from general community 
activity.   
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 In all cases, the infestation is managed. The impact on profitability, however, is 
substantial.  Table 2 provides information on cumulative NPV, average per acre cost over the 
time frame, and a range of annual costs.  All dollar amounts are in discounted dollars.  Note that 
in general the lower the initial level of infestation, the more aggressive the initial effort (relative 
to the infestation level).  At an initial infestation of 10%, the optimal initial effort level is to 
eradicate 90% of the infestation, whereas when the initial infestation level is 50%, the optimal 
initial effort eradicates only 78% of the initial infestation.11  This illustrates the trade-off between 
the increasing costs of effort and the impact on productivity of the infestation level.  Rather than 
attempting to eradicate the invasive in the initial period, a less aggressive initial approach yields 
a higher cumulative NPV.  As would be expected, higher per acre costs coincide with higher 
initial infestation levels.  Cumulative, discounted NPV is, as would be expected, inversely 
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related to the initial level of infestation.  Comparing the NPV for the 10% versus the 50% initial 
infestation, we see a decline in NPV of over 60%.  Obviously, the longer the infestation goes 
without effort to mitigate or eradicate, the more constrained the agent is in terms of being able to 
afford the costs of effort. 
[TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 Figure 4 plots the change in user cost,
 
!
!(t),  and the infestation level,!(t) over time for an 
initial infestation of 10%.  The sign on 
 
!
!(t)  changes over the time period, governed by (11), 
depending on whether the impact of additional costs today outweighs the future impact.  When 
infestation levels are declining, 
 
!
!(t) > 0,  indicating a decreasing impact on NPV from the 
invasive, but when the infestation level is increasing, 
 
!
!(t) < 0, indicating an increasing negative 
impact on the NPV.  Given that !(t) < 0,  
 
!
!(t) approaches zero from below as terminal time is 
reached in order to assure !(T ) = 0 . 
[FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
4.2 Varying Carrying Capacity.  In much of the southwest, the carrying capacity (CC) on 
rangeland is very low.12  We consider the impact of a low carrying capacity by including a 
scenario of 75 produced pounds per acre (0.1 AU), with symmetric agents.  (S = 75, with all 
other parameter values equal to those in the baseline, as presented in table 1.)  We consider 
initial infestation levels of 10%, 20%, and 30%.  Figure 5 presents the optimal effort paths under 
low CC for 10% and 20% initial infestation.  30% is not shown, as the optimal effort choice was 
to do nothing over the time horizon. 
[FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATLEY HERE] 
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The effort paths follow a somewhat familiar pattern of fairly high initial effort levels in 
order to reduce the level of the invasive weed and then the necessary effort to maintain low 
levels.  This is substantiated by figure 6, which shows the infestation levels under low carrying 
capacity with 10%, 20%, and 30% beginning infestations.  Both the 10% and the 20% infestation 
levels can be contained even with the low CC.  Because it is optimal to exert no effort at an 
initial 30%, the infestation level increases to the maximum.   
 
[FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
 
Table 3 provides a more complete picture of the impact of low CC by the outcomes to the 
baseline.  There are a number of interesting results.  First, a low CC results in less effort being 
expended in the initial period, relative to the baseline, under all three infestation levels.  This is 
to be expected, given that the revenues are lower due to the low CC.  But it should be noted that 
the lower effort levels in the 10% and 20% infestation levels do not result in uncontrollable 
infestation levels in later periods (as seen in figure 5).  While the effort levels are lower, the 
impact of cattle on weed growth is also lessened because of the lower concentration of AU per 
acre.  The impact on the economic viability of the land is striking.  The difference in NPV at an 
initial 10% infestation is almost $614 per acre less under low CC, while it is over $662 per acre 
less for the 20% initial infestation.  At a 30% infestation, the “do nothing” optimal strategy under 
low CC results in a decline of $526 per acre over the time horizon.13  
[TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 Given the results for the 30% infestation case, we ran additional scenarios to find the 
minimum price necessary for effort to be the optimal choice of the agent.  We found that a net 
price of $0.50 per pound (more than double baseline price) was necessary for effort to be 
 19 
optimal.  In this case, an initial effort that eradicated 73% of the weeds in the initial period was 
optimal.  While the weeds were controlled and the NPV over the time horizon was $140,  this is 
a decline of over $410 dollars from the baseline result. 
4.3 Asymmetric Agents.   Now consider asymmetric agents.  We assume only the initial 
infestation levels differ.  All other parameter values are the same as presented in table 1.  Agent I 
always has an initial infestation level of 10%.  Agent j’s initial infestation levels are 20%, 30%, 
40%, and 50%, across the four simulations.  Figure 7 provides traces of the optimal effort paths 
and corresponding infestation levels for the two agents under the 10%-50% scenario.  (The 
shapes of these paths are illustrative of the paths for the other asymmetric scenarios.)  Because 
agent j’s productivity does not suffer from the same level of impact from i as when both agents 
have an initial 50% infestation level, j’s initial optimal effort level is lower than in the symmetric 
case.  Agent i, however, must contend with the increased impact of j’s infestation coupled with 
j’s lower level of activity, which results in higher optimal effort levels in initial periods (relative 
to the symmetric case) to offset the impact from j. 
[FIGURE 7 APPROXIMATLEY HERE] 
 Table 4 presents the asymmetric infestation level results.  To see the impact of the 
asymmetry, we compare the results in table 4 to those in table 2.  Examining NPV, there are two 
facts that stand out as to the impact on agent i.  First, while agent i is not negatively impacted by 
agent j’s 20% infestation level (relative to the symmetric 10% results in table 2), at all other 
levels of infestation, agent i experiences declining NPV and increased average costs due to the 
impact of agent j infestation levels and optimal effort paths.  Second, when agent j’s infestation 
levels are 40% or 50%, agent i's optimal initial effort is 100% of the initial infestation.   
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The impact on agent j’s results depends on his initial level of infestation. When j has an 
initial infestation level of either 20% or 30%, his average costs are slightly higher than under the 
symmetric case and his NPV is slightly lower.  However, at 40% or 50%, his average costs are 
slightly lower and his NPV is slightly higher.  In the former case, the synergies from agent i are 
less.  This coupled with j’s higher infestation level (relative to i) result in the higher costs.  At the 
initial infestation levels of 40% and 50%, the relatively smaller impact from i's infestation more 
than offsets the lower level of effort by i.  These results begin to illustrate the increased difficulty 
in invasive species management when agents are asymmetric and that the optimality of a strategy 
may be situation dependent.  For example, the result in Thacher et al. (2009) discussed earlier of 
increasing effort by an agent if his neighbor increases his effort, may be efficient in some cases, 
but certainly not, as shown in this example, all. 
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
 
4.4 Socially Optimal Cooperative Solution.  We now consider the cooperative solution 
for this problem.  Applying the cooperative result to NM characteristics illustrates the potential 
value of information from having the knowledge of the optimal societal outcome. 
The socially optimal, cooperative solution for the asymmetric agents illustrates the 
potential impact of incentive programs.  We find the effort paths that result in the highest 
cumulative NPV’s for the two agents.  These results are presented in table 5.  
In addition to the infestation that is eradicated by the initial effort, the table includes the 
socially optimal NPV, the cumulative non-cooperative NPV, the difference per acre between the 
two, the gain to agent i and the subsidy required to be paid to agent j in order to make agent j as 
well off under the social optimum as under the non-cooperative solution.  For the 10%/20% 
combination, the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are identical.  Under the 10%/30%, 
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10%/40%, and 10%/50% solutions, agent i sees a reduction in the optimal initial effort level and 
agent j sees an increase in the optimal level.  Agent i sees an increase in his per acre NPV over 
the time period, while agent j requires a subsidy, equal to the discounted total cost of additional 
effort in order for him to follow the socially optimal effort level.14  The cooperative solution 
results in anywhere from a $0.37 per acre increase in NPV over the time horizon to $4.07 per 
acre. Note the largest difference in the cumulative NPV between the non-cooperative and the 
cooperative solution is for the 10%/40% infestation level.  Thus, the results and strategic 
management plans are specific to the scenario and a “one-size-fits-all” management solution will 
likely not be efficient. 
[TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 These results can also be used to illustrate the value of information (VoI), such as 
information about how to identify and treat invasive weeds and the benefit of doing so.  The U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) (2006) reports that there are 
over 12.5 million acres of rangeland in NM.  BLM and the Society for Range Management 
(SRM) estimate that almost half of that land or 6 million acres have been degraded by some 
invasive weeds and that roughly half-a-million acres have been recently restored (BLM 2008).   
Assuming a rancher occupancy rate of between 50% and 80% on all available rangeland, and 
alternatively the same rate but only on rangeland that has not been degraded by invasive weeds 
or that has been restored in NM, it is possible to estimate the value of the information on YST to 
ranchers in NM.  The cumulative non-cooperative result represents the outcome without public 
dissemination of information on YST.  The socially optimal NPV can be thought of as the 
outcome after public dissemination of information on YST (table 5). The difference between 
these two values is the value of information in dollars per acre for each infestation level.  We 
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assume that acres of rangeland in NM would be equally weighted between various initial 
infestation levels (10%/20%, 10%/30%, 10%/40%, and 10%/50%).  For example, for 10%/30%, 
there are 3.125 million acres of rangeland.  Table 6 shows that the gross VoI is between $20.3 
million and $6.6 million.15    
[TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
4.6 Second-Best with a Myopic Starting Point.  The above examples consider the optimal 
paths over the entire time horizon.  In reality, some agents may not exert the optimal level of 
effort.  We consider a simple deviation from the above non-cooperative solution.  Agent j 
deviates from the optimal path in only the initial time period.  Given the sub-optimal starting 
point the rest of his effort path is optimal, resulting in a second best path.  Agent i, however 
chooses the optimal effort taking into account the effort of agent j.  What is the impact of this 
single period deviation?  For illustrative purposes, we focus on the asymmetric set of agents with 
agent i having an initial infestation level of 10% and agent j having an initial infestation level of 
50%.  We present the results for 0%, 30%, and 50% initial effort levels for agent j.  These 
starting effort levels deviate from the optimal by -36, -6, and +14% respectively.  In all cases 
agent i chooses the optimal path, given j’s strategy.  Table 7 presents pertinent results. 
If agent j’s initial effort level is 0%, the optimal path for this agent for the remainder of 
the time horizon is also zero effort.  Agent i, however, still finds it optimal to exert effort and in 
this case, the effort level is 100% of the infestation level over the entire time horizon.  Agent j 
makes a profit off of the land in early periods, but the profits decline to zero as the infestations 
increase and finally the land is abandoned.  
If agent j’s effort begins at 30% (60% eradication of the initial infestation) agent i's 
optimal initial effort level is 10% (initial eradication of 100% of the infestation).  As would be 
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expected, this is a higher initial effort level than under the non-cooperative solution because i has 
to compensate for lack of initial action by j.  When j’s initial efforts are 50% (eradication of 
100% of initial infestation), i can reduce his efforts to eradication of 70% of his initial 
infestation.  The impact on the individual agents’ NPVs can be substantial.  For the zero effort 
paths, NPVs decline $261.75 and $189.73 for i and j respectively.  When j begins eradication at a 
level above the optimum, agent i realizes an increase in his NPV of $5.43 per acre, while j loses 
$1.61 per acre.        
[TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 Finally, we consider the impact of agent j’s myopic choice of no initial effort with a 50% 
initial infestation on agent i's optimal choice as agent i's initial infestation level increases.  The 
question is, at what infestation level does agent i find it optimal to do nothing?  Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find that it is optimal for agent i to exert effort as long as his initial infestation 
level is 47% or less.  If the initial infestation level is 48% (or greater), the optimal choice is to do 
nothing. 
Again, these scenarios illustrate the value of information.  A single miss-step by one 
agent greatly impacts the outcome for the group.  
 
5.0  Conclusions and Future Directions 
 We model the management choices of individual agents contending with invasive weeds 
as a two-state, dynamic game.  Parameterizing feedback Nash equilibrium response functions for 
Yellow Starthistle in New Mexico allows us to simulate the optimal effort paths for cattle 
ranchers and illustrate the potential trade-offs faced due to the impact of the invasive on the 
productivity of the land.  We present results for symmetric and asymmetric agents.  We also 
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compare the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions.  With this we consider the potential 
value of information.   
 The optimal path is dependent on the beginning states.  For a low level infestation, the 
optimal strategy begins with aggressive effort.  As the initial level of the infestation increases, 
agents find it optimal to be relatively less aggressive in the initial period, illustrating the trade-off 
between cost of effort today versus the impact on the value of production in the future.  Further, 
we show the impact of carrying capacity on optimal results.  Under conditions of low 
productivity and relatively low net prices, the opportunity to effectively manage invasive species 
is reduced as is profitability.  Specific to asymmetric agents, a high infestation agent situated 
next to a low infestation agent finds that less initial effort is required (relative to symmetric 
agents) because of the relatively lower diffusion levels from the neighbor. 
 The results illustrate the complexity of invasive species management.  Heterogeneity of 
agents, as well as any heterogeneity of the invasive stocks will surely result in a menu of 
strategies, where the optimal strategy depends on the specific characteristics of the problem. Our 
results indicate a “one-size-fits-all” management plan for invasive weeds may see successes, but 
will surely see a number of failures as well.   
The scenarios included in this paper represent only a tiny portion of those that are 
relevant.  Differences in diffusion levels, animal units, price paths, effort costs and management 
time horizons are but a few of the extensions to be explored.  In order to focus on the economics 
of the dynamic game, our model abstracts from more specific models of cattle foraging and 
conversion to mass, as well as from the ecological models of plant growth.  These are clear 
extensions to the model.  In addition, the inclusion of the capital value of the land, as well as 
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Figure 1: Unfettered Invasive Growth 
Figure 2: Optimal Effort Paths 
Figure 3: Infestation Levels 
Figure 4:  Change in User Cost and Infestation Level 
Figure 5:  Optimal Effort with Low Carrying Capacity 
Figure 6: Infestation Levels Under Low Carrying Capacity 




                                                
1 The dynamic game theoretic model draws on Martin, et al. (1993). 








3 Each agent chooses a best response each period in a sequential process that takes the actions of 
other agents into account and that in the end they have no incentive to deviate from; but the 
process is unlike a sequential game in which the agents choose less restrictive behavioral 
“strategies” that are only Nash equilibria under specific information sets and other rigid 
requirements. 
4 For an interior solution to hold, the resultant Hamiltonian is concave in wi  and !i .   That is; 
Hwi wi < 0 and H!i!i < 0.  Thus the functions utilized in the model, which include the argument of 
the state and control, abstract from specific models of cattle foraging and conversion to mass, as 
well as from the ecological models of plant growth.  
5 Either an acre of land can be used to produce at the optimal carrying capacity or it is avoided by 
ranchers.  We steer away from attempting to model the profitability of range-feeding cattle as a 
business enterprise.  Confinement cattle operations are also used and have in certain 
circumstances in the past been more profitable, but USDA organic standards for livestock have 
recently put an emphasis on “free-range” livestock production practices.  It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to consider profit-maximizing beef production input decisions with uncertain and in 
some situations strategically derived future production conditions.   
6 There is a growing literature on the ecology of rangeland dynamics for agricultural and 
biodiversity in general and for New Mexico specifically (e.g., http://usda-ars.nmsu.edu, last 
accessed 10/27/09).  However, tractability in the numerical solution of the dynamic game may 
become an issue.   
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7 Note that at some points in time during the growing season there is the possibility that grazing 
can result in reducing the weed level.  However, over a complete growing/grazing cycle (i.e., one 
season) we impose an inverse relationship between grazing and weed growth. 
8 Stella 8.0 (2003) is used to carry out the simulations. 
9For more information on YST see, for example, Wilson et al. 2003, Shelley et al. 1999, or 
Thomsen et al. 1996. 
10 For example, consider NM.  While more than 50% of farms and ranches are less than 50 acres 
in size, almost 20% have more than 1000 acres (NASS 2007).  25% of beef cattle are run on 
operations of less than 100 head, while more than 20% of beef cattle are run in operations of 
more than 1000 head.  While a majority of ranches are found in the east and northwestern part of 
the state, almost all counties have some ranches.  The larger, more profitable ranches are 
generally found in the east, while smaller less profitable ranches are found in the southern part of 
the state.  Ranches in the north may be irrigated, while those in the south are most likely not.  
Carrying capacity varies across the state, but by all standards, the carrying capacity for rangeland 
is low, given the harsh, dry climate.  Culturally, the state is also diverse, which is reflected in the 
ranching community.  Almost 40 percent of farmers in the state are Hispanic or Latino.  While 
many ranchers are fourth and fifth generation, or more, there are others who are first generation, 
part-time ranchers.  NM is not alone in this level of heterogeneity in the ranching community 
11 The 90% and 78% of initial infestation level refers only to the individual agent’s actions.  The 
change in the infestation level is, therefore less, due to the other factors in eq (6). 
12 Depending on the agency, carrying capacities on federally leased land in the US vary from 
0.04 AU per acre to more than 1.8 AU per acre. 
13We found 22% is the highest initial infestation level that results in an effort by the agents. 
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14 An external source of funding would be required to implement the subsidy. 
15 This does not include an offset for the cost of disseminating public YST information, which is 
not known.  The cost would depend on the information delivery system and the effectiveness of 
that system.  For example, if an effective, existing web-based system could be utilized the costs 
would be substantially less than if a new information system were required.  Thus, our example 
provides an upper bound on the VoI. 
16 The price of beef cattle has varied substantially over the last several years, as has the cost to 
produce cattle for sale.  We use net price of $20 per hundredweight as our base.  This assumes a 
cost of about $73 per hundredweight to produce and a market price of $93 per hundredweight.   
17 The carrying capacity is based on .7 AU per acre per season. 
18 The cost parameters used in the baseline simulation allow for a large range of costs per acre.  
The baseline parameters allow for effort costs between $0.50 per acre and $150 per acre.  This 
allows for increasing costs as the infestation level increases and as the level of effort increases, 
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